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On 21 July 2005 China adopted an undisclosed basket exchange rate regime. We formally 
assess and envisage the gradual evolution of the renminbi over time. We utilize nonlinear 
dependencies in the renminbi exchange rate and describe the smooth transition of the 
renminbi/U.S. dollar (RMB/USD) exchange rate using the family of time-varying 
autoregressive (TV-AR) models. Specifically, the nonlinear models allow for a smooth 
transition from one optimal level to another. Our estimation results imply that the RMB/USD 
exchange rate will likely be about 7.10 RMB/USD in summer/autumn 2009. 
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“An  Economist  …  is  an  expert  who  will 
know tomorrow why the things he predicted 
yesterday  did  not  happen  today.  This  is 
especially true of currency forecasting.”
The Economist, February 25
th 1995, p. 19
1. Introduction
One  issue  which  has  been  the  subject  of  intensive  debate  among  academic  economists  and 
politicians alike is the Renminbi (RMB) exchange rate. On July 21, 2005, after more than a decade 
of pegging the renminbi to the U.S. dollar (USD) at an exchange rate of 8.277, the People´s Bank of 
China (PBoC) announced a revaluation of the currency, together with a reform of the exchange rate 
regime.
1 In the new regime, the PBoC manages the RMB against an undisclosed basket of currencies 
of  the  main  trading  partners.
2 Although  critics  were  not  impressed  with  the  initial  2.1  percent 
appreciation of the RMB to 8.11 per USD, much initial excitement surrounded the Chinese pledge to 
link the RMB to a group of major currencies. Many economists have argued that the modest RMB 
revaluation merely marks  the  beginning of a more significant evolution of the currency regime 
which could translate into a major upward revaluation if the RMB in accordance with market forces.
Concerns about China´s competitive threat as a global production  place are widespread in both 
advanced and emerging economies. For a start, the large bilateral U.S.-China trade deficit has led to 
American pressure to revalue the RMB. Above and beyond this pressure, the U.S. has been joined 
by the international community, including the G-8 and the IMF, in encouraging China to implement 
greater  exchange  rate  flexibility,  which  would  most  likely  be  associated  with  a  larger  RMB 
appreciation. Greater flexibility in China’s exchange rate is viewed as an essential element of a 
global response to the large macroeconomic imbalances in the world economy. 
In  East  Asia  there  are  concerns  that  China´s  industrialisation  -  underpinned  by  cheap  labour  -
devalues manufacturing assets outside China. This concern stems from the  fact that the  current 
hollowing out of their low-end manufacturing trade in third markets, as well as their trade with 
China,  may  soon  extend  to  more  complex  production  processes.  Gaulier  et  al.  (2007)  have 
demonstrated that, since the emergence of China, Asian trade has become increasingly centred on 
China – a development largely driven by the international segmentation of production processes. 
Lall and Albaladejo (2004) have analysed exports disaggregated according to technological content 
in  order  to  gain  a  deeper  understanding  of  China´s  changing  competitive  edge  vis  à  vis  its 
                                                
1 The  terms “renminbi”  and  “yuan” are  generally  used interchangeably to  refer  to  China´s  currency.  The 
renminbi is the currency, while the yuan is the unit of account. 
2 This poses a problem in that the announcement and subsequent clarifications leave the Chinese central bank 
with  considerable  discretion  over  its  renminbi  target.  Funke  and  Rahn  (2005)  have  estimated  that  the 
equilibrium renminbi exchange rate against the U.S. dollar is undervalued by 10-15 percent, while Cheung et 3
neighbours.  Their  work  has  yielded  the  well-documented  insight  that  China  has  boosted  intra-
regional trade. Furthermore they have shown that the Asian countries differ greatly in their industrial 
capabilities  and  that  the  competitive  threat  facing  each  country  therefore  differs  greatly.  With 
appropriate restructuring, most countries will be able to match China´s export surge and maintain 
high rates of export growth. The real threat is to the less technologically advanced Tigers that have 
much higher wages than China but lack the domestic capabilities to climb up the quality ladder.
3
A substantial literature has emerged examining the de facto currency regimes which are currently in 
operation [see Calvo and Reinhart (2002)]. Given this literature, our paper seeks to address questions 
such as (i) what is the nature of the current RMB exchange rate regime? (ii) Is a basket in operation 
and if yes, what are the weights of the various currencies? (iii) How can we envisage the gradual 
evolution of the de facto currency regime towards a new equilibrium? 
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly outlines the new RMB basket 
peg. Section 3 discusses the de facto currency regime in operation using a rule-of-thumb framework. 
In Section 4 we exploit the time-varying TV-AR family of models which is suitable for describing 
the evolution of regimes with a smooth transition. Section 5 summarizes the findings and concludes 
with some general remarks.
2. How Does the New Renminbi Peg Work?
The  Chinese basket peg replaces the  obligation  to hold  the  RMB exchange rate within a fixed 
margin of the USD with an obligation to hold the RMB within a fixed margin of a constant nominal 
value of a basket of currencies. On 10 August 2005, three weeks after China abandoned its decade-
old peg to the USD, the PBoC revealed the mix of this basket.
4 However, the weights attached to 
each currency were not revealed.
5 According to the PBoC, the US dollar (USD), the Japanese yen 
(JPY), the euro (EUR) and the South Korean won (KRW) have the largest weights, but the basket 
also includes the currencies of Australia (AUD), Canada (CAD), Great Britain (GBP), Malaysia 
(MYR), Russia (RUB), Singapore (SQD), and Thailand (THB). Given the political problems this 
might pose, the Hong Kong and Taiwanese dollars are absent. The choice of currencies (and hence 
presumably the weights), depends not only on the pattern of China's trade but also on the sources of 
its foreign direct investment and the currency composition of its reserves. 
                                                                                                                                                     
al. (2007) have found that once serial correlation and uncertainty is accounted for, there is little statistical 
evidence that the renminbi is undervalued. A survey of the literature is provided by Dunaway et al. (2006).
3  A  theoretical  variety  expansion  growth  model  allowing  for  industrial  hollowing-out  has  recently  been 
presented by Kim (2007). According to the model, due to China´s increasing “experience capital” the Asian 
countries  will  experience  an  industrial  hollowing-out  unless  they  are  able  to  switch  to  more  technology-
intensive products and exports.    
4 Singapore, which has operated a similar system since the 1980s, has never taken such a step.
5 The obvious disadvantage of the undisclosed basket peg therefore is a lack of transparency. Markets may 
become flustered about what may happen next.4
The operation of the new system involves the daily calculation of a new central parity (“medium 
value” in the gap/band).
6 Initially the trading range was monitored and controlled at  0.15% around 
this medium value for the USD, with different ranges for other currencies (perhaps 0.5-1% for EUR 
and JPY).
7 On 18 May 2007, the PBoC eventually widened the RMB´s daily trading band against 
the USD from 0.30% to 0.50%.
8
There are several similarities between the Chinese system and Singapore´s basket system. Singapore 
adopted its basket approach in 1981 and it was seen as a halfway house between fixed and flexible 
currencies. Notable similarities between the two systems include the following: (i) Both countries 
link their currency to a basket of major currencies; (ii) both have a central parity and a moving band, 
and finally (iii) Singapore does not reveal exactly how its basket of currencies is constructed, an 
approach China appears to be emulating. The motivation is to ward off speculators. On the other 
hand, there is no capital control in Singapore and therefore no need to publish the official central 
parity.  The  band  for  Singapore  is  announced  semi-annually.  Singapore's  Monetary  Authority 
intervene at their own discretion to maintain the central parity and the band. The PBoC publishes the 
central parity every evening (necessitated by the fact that they have capital control and RMB is not 
freely tradable). 
The basket is likely to be heavily dominated by the USD. Using China’s trade weights, a four 
currency basket would have the following weights: USD (50%), JPY (20%), EUR (15%), and KRW 
(10%). The hard dollar pegs (USD and HKD) therefore account for close to 50% of the basket. If 
one considers the JPY as a soft USD peg, the weight on the dollar could be as high as 80%. This 
means that the RMB/USD will still be very “compliant”, with the index being “sticky” relative to the 
USD.
The development of the RMB/USD exchange rate since July 2005 is plotted in Figure 1. Since 
departing  from  its  USD  peg  at  21  July  2005,  the  RMB  has  gradually  appreciated  –  albeit  by 
incremental margins – moving from its original parity of 8.11 RMB/USD to about 7.6 RMB/USD as 
of late June 2007.  
                                                
6 Consider a simple example: Assume that the basket just contains the USD and the EUR with weights of  70% 
and 30%, respectively. On July 22 (as announced on July 21 evening), the rate is 1 USD = 8.11 RMB and 1 
EUR = 9.81 RMB (because 1 EUR = 1.21 USD), to get 8.11 RMB you need USD 0.70 and EUR 0.30/1.21. 
During the day RMB/USD is allowed to trade at 8.11  0.012. When recalculating the exchange rate, the
PBoC will take the spot price of USD and EUR. If, for example, the EUR/USD = 1.19, then the new central 
parity  for  USD/RMB  will  become  [8.110.70  +  9.81(1/1.19)0.30]  =  8.15.  The  corresponding  new 
EUR/RMB central parity is then 8.151.19 = 9.70. During day trade, PBoC will defend the exchange rate for 
the USD within the  0.015% band.
7 PBoC have also stressed that they only “reference” a basket formula and that they have the discretion to not 
follow the formula strictly.
8 The widening of the band may be a token gesture and may not indicate a policy change leading to a faster 
appreciation of the Renminbi. The reason is that the renminbi never hit its previous trading limits, so even 
within the tighter band it could have appreciated faster.5
Figure 1: Daily China – U.S. Foreign Exchange Rate (RMB/USD)
Note:  All  daily  exchange  rates  were  obtained  from  the  Pacific  Exchange  Rate  Service  (see 
http://fx.sauder.ubc.ca/).
The conventional wisdom is that the Renminbi has not moved much since the PBoC adopted the 
new regime in July 2005. This may be interpreted as a gradual policy approach trying to avoid 
slashing the RMB value of central bank reserves. In the next section we therefore track the (time-
varying) weightings of the currencies in the basket. 
3. A Standard Monitoring Procedure
We begin by calculating the de facto RMB currency regime that has been in place since July 2005 
using  a  linear  regression model  that  measures  the  relationship  between  daily  changes  in  cross-
currency rates. In order to monitor the new RMB basket peg system, we first employ the easy-to-use 
Haldane and Hall (1991) and Frankel and Wei (2007) methodology which has been used extensively 
in the exchange rate literature. Formally, the estimated model can be expressed as follows:
(1)
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, / 8 , / 7 , / 6 , / 5
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      
       
         6
where the exchange rate data consists of the log-level daily spot prices (Ei/k,t) and  is the first-
difference operator.
9 The numeraire currency k used here is the Swiss Franc because the Swiss Franc 
is known to be a clean floating exchange rate. The OLS estimation results with robust standard 
errors are given in Table 1 below. The error term appears to have a fat-tailed distribution relative to 
the normal distribution, i.e. large changes tend to be followed by large changes, and small changes 
tend to follow small changes.
10 Therefore, we have also estimated a conditional GARCH-in-mean 
model specification where the conditional variance takes the form 
(2) h h t t t 1 2
2
1 1 0          .
The two cases of interest are:
(i) Peg to the USD: When the RMB is still pegged to the USD, then 1 is close to 1 and  2 = 3 = ... 
= 11 = 0.
(ii) Basket peg: If instead a basket peg is in operation, then the coefficients 1 = 2 = ... = 11 would 
turn out to be positive and significant.
The estimation results using high-frequency daily data for the period 26 July 2005 to 19 December 
2007 are given in Table 1. As shocks to the mean equation are the main actors in the multivariate 
framework, it is important that the mean equation is not misspecified. The final specification of the 
mean equation and the lag structure has been chosen using information criteria. The diagnostic tests 
fail to detect any autocorrelation, thereby suggesting that there is little unexplained dependence in 
the data. The ARCH tests performed on the squared residuals turn out insignificant, which indicates 
that the GARCH(1,1) model does a good job of tracking the strong temporal dependence in the 
variance. 
                                                
9 The daily series represent changes between business days with no adjustment for holidays.
10 Conditional heteroscedasticity in nominal exchange rate residuals is a well-known feature of daily exchange 
rate data that tends to vanish at lower frquencies due to time aggregation. With heteroscedasticity, the OLS 
estimator  is  still  unbiased  and  consistent  but  it  is  not  BLUE  or  asymptotically  efficient.  When 
heteroscedasticity is mild, OLS standard errors behave quite well [Long and Ervin 2000)]. However, when 
heteroscedasticity is severe, ignoring it may bias the standard errors. The direction of the bias depends on the 
pattern of heteroscedasticity: standard errors may be too large or too small. Usually, heteroscedasticity is a 
nuisance that cannot be modeled because its source is not well understood. In this case, a classic correction for 
heteroscedasticity is the HC0 estimator proposed by White (1980). But although this estimator is correct in 
large  samples,  it  is  no  better  than  OLS  in  small  samples.  MacKinnon  and  White  (1985)  discussed  three 
improvements, HC1, HC2, and HC3. The evaluation by Long and Ervin (2000) suggests that HC3 is the best, 
especially in small samples.7
Table 1: Estimating the Implicit Basket Weights
OLS GARCH(1,1)
Estimates Prob-values Estimates Prob-values
USD 0.911 0.0001 0.910 0.0001
EUR -0.043 0.0761 -0.027 0.1603
JPY 0.006 0.4618 0.012 0.1351
KRW 0.031 0.0032 0.025 0.0046
SQD -0.003 0.8742 -0.017 0.3079
GBP 0.009 0.4194 0.010 0.3341
MYR 0.034 0.0808 0.045 0.0046
RUB 0.026 0.3325 0.039 0.1276
AUD 0.013 0.1320 0.009 0.2476
THB -0.005 0.3621 -0.005 0.3662
CAD -0.009 0.2905 -0.008 0.2503
Constant -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001
   Conditional Variance Equation
0 - - 0.000 0.6549
1 - - 0.044 0.0190
2 - - 0.944 0.0001
R-squared 0.98 - 0.98 -
Diagnostics: Test statistics Prob-values Test statistics Prob-values
ARCH(4) 5.196 0.0004 1.094 0.3588
ARCH(8) 2.914 0.0034 0.947 0.4768
ARCH(12) 2.198 0.0107 0.728 0.7245
Note: White Heteroscedasticity-robust and Bollerslev-Wooldridge standard errors have been used for the OLS 
and GARCH(1,1) models, respectively.
The results indicate that the new regime has rather little flexibility. The coefficient for the USD is 
nearly one and therefore this particular Gordian knot has not yet been disentangled. There is weak 
evidence of a peg to a basket but the weights of the remaining currencies are very small. Despite 
claims  to  the  contrary,  an  analysis  following  the  principle  “actions  speak  louder  than  words” 
therefore yields that policy continuity is in place in China. Alternatively one may say that the PBoC 
still has to walk the talk.
11
The Frankel and Wei (2007) approach also allows one to trace the development of the de facto
exchange rate system over time. In order to identify movement away from the USD peg towards a 
basket peg, we have also calculated the GARCH-in-mean specification as a rolling regression. The 
estimation results for the USD coefficient are presented in Figure 2.
                                                
11 One reason for the gradual approach is that the institutional constraint that an efficient and market-oriented 
FX market, which provides the needed foundation for any move towards greater exchange rate flexibility, still 
does  not  exist  in  China.  China´s  FX  market  is  limited  in  product  scope  to  mainly  spot  trading  in  USD. 
Interbank forward and swap transactions were finally introduced in successive reform measures in August 
2005, but the markets are shallow.  8
Figure 2: Rolling Regression Results for the Implicit Basket Weight of the USD (Solid Line) 
and  2 Standard Errors (Dashed Lines)
Note: The rolling regressions have been calculated using a bandwidth of 100 observations. The horizontal axis 
gives  the  initial  span  of  100  respective  observations.  Qualitatively  similar  results  are  obtained  for  other 
bandwidths.
The overall conclusion once again is that the RMB has remained pegged to the USD, with rather 
limited currency flexibility. 
Although the Frankel and Wei (2007) approach makes intuitive sense, it has some drawbacks. In 
particular, one must bear in mind that the tests may be biased if the RMB exchange rate follows a 
nonlinear  process.  To  measure  how  the  previous  rigid  exchange  rate  system  may  be  gradually 
phased  out  towards  a  more  flexible  exchange  rate  regime,  we  therefore  additionally  employ  a 
smooth transition modelling approach to learn more about the smooth evolution of the currency 
regime over time. 
4. Beyond the “Rule-of-Thumb” Framework
An important feature of the previous results is the finding that the Chinese authorities have tried to 
engineer a gradual shift in the RMB exchange rate.
12 Given this gradual shift, and in order to shed 
                                                
12 While China shared many initial conditions with the transition economies of Central-East Europe (CEE) and 
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), it had a more stable political system compared to many CEE 
and CIS countries and the communist party of China rules the country as an autocrat without really imposing 9
further light on the new RMB basket, we now consider univariate time-varying smooth transition 
autoregression (TV-AR and TV-AR-GARCH) models as a refinement and in the hope of delineating 
the RMB/USD pattern more accurately.
13 Our working hypothesis is that the de facto RMB/USD 
exchange rate exhibits nonlinear features and that TV-AR models can adequately characterize the 
smooth nonlinear evolution of the Chinese exchange rate regimes.
14 An important rationale for this 
family of models is that all the relevant information is embodied in the most recent RMB/USD 
central parity, so that is becomes unnecessary to include further variables in the set of explanatory 
variables.  
We  first  present  a  brief  review  of  the  methodological  issues.  The  basic  problem  facing  any 
econometrician  is  to  determine  the  fundamental  relationship  between  a  dependent  variable, 
ERMB/USD, and a vector of regressors, expressed by X. The question is  how best to specify the 
functional form f{} in equation (3)
(3)    t t USD RMB X f E    / ,
where  t  is  the  residual. The  methodology used  here  builds  on  the  existing STAR  literature to 
investigate the gradual Chinese policy approach towards the RMB/USD exchange rate. We obtain a 
smooth line capturing “shifts” in the RMB/USD relationship and which can be interpreted as the 
smooth transition trajectory between exchange rate regimes.
The modelling cycle, fully described by Teräsvirta (1994) and Lin and Teräsvirta (1994), comprises 
three stages. (i) We first specifiy and estimate a linear model which is tested against nonlinear 
alternatives using a battery of tests; (ii) if linearity is rejected, we specify and estimate the nonlinear 
model; and (iii) we evaluate the nonlinear model. Consider the return series {ERMB/USD,t}, regressors 
                                                                                                                                                     
itself as such. Unlike most of the CEE and CIS economies, China nevertheless adopted a strategy of gradual 
economic transformation that maintained the existing system but created new economic activities on top of it. 
This enabled China to avoid the initial transformation slump observed in CEE and CIS countries, and allowed 
it  to  generate  high  rates  of  economic  growth  that  have  now  lasted  for  almost  three  decades.  Given  this 
experience,  the  PBoC  has  stated  (see  http://www.pbc.gov.cn/english//detail.asp?col=6400&ID=572)  it  will 
carry the exchange rate regime reform forward in a gradual manner to ensure sufficient resilience of all parties 
involved. The underlying worry is the potential for rioting if exporters lose sales and lay off workers, or even 
if exporters simply hire fewer workers each year at a time when nearly 10 million migrant workers are pouring 
into Chinese cities each year from rural areas.
13 It would be straightforward to augment the framework to allow for further exogenous variables as additional 
regressors.
14 This contrasts, for example, with the Markov regime-switching model which assumes an abrupt switch 
between  regimes.  Aside  from  potential  nonlinearity,  considerable  research  has  also  focused  on  structural 
change and time-varying parameters in time-series models. Structural breaks and parameter variation may 
occur because of institutional change, an evolving policy environment, or technological innovation. Recently, 
nonlinear models have been combined with model specifications that facilitate structural change and parameter 
time variation. For example, Holt and Craig (2006), Lundbergh et al. (2003), Skalin and Teräsvirta (2002), and 
van Dijk et al. (2003) combine the TV-AR model of Lin and Teräsvirta (1994) with smoothly time-varying 
parameters with STAR models to obtain a time-varying STAR (TV-STAR) model which considers the joint 
presence of nonlinearity and structural instability. Boero and Marrocu (2002) and Cao and Soofi (1999) have 
shown that nonlinear methods can be successfully employed in exchange rate prediction.10
xit = (1, ERMB/USD,t-1, …., ERMB/USD,t-1)’, i = 1,2, and a white noise stochastic shock t. We follow 
Skalin and Teräsvirta (2002) and Panos et al. (1997) by including the lagged level term ERMB/USD,t-1
as an explanatory variable and thereby allowing for the possibility of an error-correction mechanism 
(ECM). We expect the estimated coefficient of ERMB/USD,t-1 to be negative, i.e. we assume that the 
process is mean-reverting. The class of two-regime TV-AR processes is represented as
(4)       t t t t c t F x x E       , , 2 2 1 1 ,
for  some  transition  function  F():  
3   [0,  1],  slope  or  smoothness  parameter    >  0,  location 
parameter c, and transition variable time t. The time index t is a short-cut which captures the gradual 
policy approach of the PBoC and the errors      , 0 ~ 2 NID t . 
The above specification is quite flexible, in that it embeds other paradigms as limiting cases. If the 
smoothness  parameter    and/or  the  vector  2  are  zero,  then  the  process  collapses  to  a  linear 
autoregression. As   , the regime switch becomes a single break and therefore the TV-AR 
becomes a self-exciting threshold autoregression (SETAR) model [Tsay (1989)].
15
In equation (4) we have been deliberately vague about the precise functional form F() which is 
sufficiently broad to encompass various parameterisations. The transition function has to be twice 
continuously  differentiable  in   and  c.  Following  the  vast  majority  of  applied  research  and  to 
simplify the exposition, we consider the logistic function







which allows the exchange rate to change in a possibly gradual and smooth manner. Instead of 
imposing a certain a priori view on the matter, the TV-AR model permits the data to determine the 
nature (duration and size) of the nonlinear transition process.
Estimation of a TV-AR model involves, in principle, a straightforward application of nonlinear least 
squares.  When      , 0 ~ 2 NID t   is  valid,  the  nonlinear  least  squares  is  equivalent  to  maximum 
likelihood based on a Gaussian likelihood function. If      , 0 ~ 2 NID t  is not valid, then nonlinear 
least squares can be interpreted as quasi maximum likelihood estimates which are still consistent 
under suitable regularity conditions. As pointed out by Granger and Teräsvirta (1993) and Teräsvirta 
(1994, pp. 216-217), whilst the other parameter estimates may converge rapidly, the estimate for 
may do so only very slowly, particular when the true parameter value is large. Therefore, reasonable 
                                                
15 van Dijk and Franses (1999) have generalised the STAR model by introducing further transition variables to 
obtain a multiple regime MRSTAR framework.  11
starting values for c and  should be obtained from a two-dimensional grid search over possible c
and   parameters.  
We first present results on the estimation of a provisional linear ECM model fitted to ERMB/USD. The 
linear model takes the form
(6) t t p t p t t bE E a E a c E              1 1 1 ... .
The Akaike information criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) have been 
used  to  determine  the  appropriate  lag length.  The  best-fitting ECM  and  several  diagnostics are 
recorded in Table 2 and 3, respectively.
16








Note: Both information criteria indicate an optimal lag length p = 2.
                                                
16 The overwhelming evidence in the empirical literature is that exchange rates are nonstationary. We have not 
investigated  this  issue  because  standard  unit  root  tests  are  of  questionable  value  when  nonlinear  TV-AR 
models are considered. See Skalin and Teräsvirta (2002).12
Table 3: ECM Parameter Estimates
Parameters Estimates Prob-values
c -0.007 0.0047
1 a -0.161 0.0001
2 a -0.123 0.0026
b 0.003 0.0059











Notes: LM(k) is the LM test of no remaining autocorrelation in the residuals up to and
including lag k.  RCH(k) is the LM test of no autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity
in the residuals up to and including lag k. JB is the Jarque-Bera test of normality of  the
residuals. Finally, BDS(m) is a test for nonlinearity in a series where m is the so-called 
embedding dimension. The sample period is 7/26/2005 – 12/19/2007.
The overall picture that emerges from Table 3 is one of no autocorrelation in the residuals but strong 
evidence  of  nonlinearity.
17  Furthermore, the  hypotheses  of  no  ARCH  effects  and  normality are 
soundly rejected. The implication of this evidence is that estimating linear exchange rate models 
disregarding the presence of nonlinearity may yield misspecified models. As such, the results and 
conclusions of linear modelling approaches have to be received with reservations. 
Based on these preliminary results, we next fit a TV-AR and a TV-AR-GARCH model to the data 
by using nonlinear least squares.
18  The basic TV-AR model corresponding to the case k = 1 in Lin 
and Teräsvirta (1996, p. 214) takes the form
(7) t t t t t t t F E b E a bE E a E                       ) , ( ) ( ) 1 1 1 1 ,
where
                                                
17 Note, however, that the nonlinearity tests cannot actually pin down the proper form of nonlinearity.
18 Our modelling approach implies that we assign a low probability to another discrete “one-off” appreciation.
We believe that for the PBoC to make such a move, one of the following two conditions would need to be met.
(i) Domestic inflation  moves out of control; or  (ii) another discrete jump  would produce an international
political gain that would be sufficient to make the appreciation worthwhile. Neither condition will ikely be met 
in 2008. First, there is  no basis for sustained  inflation in  China and the currently high inflation  is set to 
moderate in 2008. Second, it is unrealistic to believe that a meaningful political gain can be achieved prior to 
the U.S. presidential election in January 2009.  13
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The parameter estimates of the TV-AR model capturing the gradual Chinese policy approach are 
given in Table 4.
19














Note: Sample period: 7/26/2005 – 12/19/2007.
The key coefficients    and c are statistically significant,  which itself indicates the presence of  
nonlinearity.  The residual diagnostics, however, indicate some remaining heteroscedasticity. This 
suggests that the TV-AR model has not identified all of the nonlinearities in the data. Given the 
apparent ARCH effects, the following TV-AR-GARCH(1,1) model has also been considered:
(9) t t t t t t t F E b E a bE E a E                       ) , ( ) ( ) 1 1 1 1 ,
where
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1 1 0      t t t h e h    .14
The estimation results can be found in Table 5.











0  9.65E-09 0.0085
1  0.048 0.0006
2  0.940 0.0001




Note: Sample period: 7/26/2005 – 12/19/2007.
From Table 5 it is clear that the key coefficients are, again, statistically significant. Consistent with 
the gradual Chinese policy approach, the small size of the point estimate of  indicates a slow-
moving transition from one regime to the other.
20  In all, these results suggest that our intuition of 
the smooth TV-AR modelling framework is plausible and that the previous evidence for the linear 
Frankel and Wei (2007) modelling framework may be premature. 
Next, we analyse the implied long run (deterministic) equilibrium for the TV-AR model, which is 
plotted in Figure 3. Visual evidence suggests that the nonlinear “skeleton” corresponds closely with 
the actual exchange rate dynamics, i.e. the TV-AR model´s ability to adequately characterise the 
gradual appreciation is clearly visible. Based on these findings and assuming no further breaks in the 
RMB/USD exchange rate, the deterministic extrapolation indicates that the RMB/USD exchange 
rate will appreciate smoothly from 8.09 RMB/USD, where it resided immediately after the initial 
appreciation in July 2005, to 7.10 in autumn 2009.
                                                                                                                                                     
19 Initially we have considered the same autoregressive order as in the linear ECM. Estimating corresponding 
TV-AR and TV-AR-GARCH models, however, does not yield reasonable results. As a consequence,  we have 
dropped Et-2.
20 When interpreting the   parameter, one should keep in mind however that the asymptotic distribution of the 
smoothness parameter is, in any event, nonstandard under the hypothesis  = 0. See van Dijk et al. (2002), pp. 
19-21.15
Figure 3: Actual Daily RMB/USD Exchange Rate and Estimated Logistic Transition Function
In summary we conclude that daily RMB/USD exchange rate since the beginning of 2005 can be 
modelled as a nonlinear TV_AR or TV-AR_GARCH model.
21
5. Summary and Some Concluding Thoughts
   
This paper presents some novel empirical evidence on the new renminbi exchange rate regime. 
Based  upon  the  view  that  Chinese  policy  changes  rarely  ever  take  place  overnight,  we  have 
examined the extent to which TV-AR and TV-AR-GARCH models contribute to our understanding 
of the gradual reform process underlying the new RMB exchange rate regime. There are several 
reasons to believe a priori that a TV-AR framework might be fruitful. First, previous research has 
found evidence of nonlinearities in exchange rates. Second, the gradual Chinese policy approach 
suggests  a  smooth  transition  TV-AR  model.  Third,  the  TV-AR  approach  is  flexible  enough  to 
                                                
21 One potential problem is that nonlinearities are present but they are captured by the wrong type of nonlinear 
model. For the sake of completeness, we have also estimated TV-AR and TV-AR-GARCH models assuming 
that the smooth transition function can be adequately approximated by a polynomial function of t up to order k
= 3. See Lin and Teräsvirta [1994, p. 214, eq. (2)]. Again, the estimated transition parameter appears to be 
significantly different from zero. Furthermore, the graphical information on the nonlinear transition is identical 
to the k = 1 case. The results are insufficiently different to justify a separate discussion but they are available 
from the authors upon request.16
accommodate future policy changes by assuming a double-transition (three-regime) TV-AR model 
specification. 
This study has brought to the fore the observation that changes in Chinese policy usually take place 
through a series of smaller steps.
22 The much-talked-about threat underlying this policy approach is 
the fear that a sharp appreciation of the RMB could seriously hurt Chinese GDP growth. 
Figure 4: Japan´s Exchange Rate and GDP Growth, 1975 – 2005
                                                
22 He Fan of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences published recently an article in „China Daily“ (2007-08-
07; see http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2007-08/07/content_5448940.htm) suggesting that China might 
sell (one day) some of its USD treasuries. He believes that the RMB should be allowed to appreciate, but he 
also clearly indicates that the U.S. should not try to dictate the pace of RMB appreciation, particularly given 
that the RMB/USB exchange rate is a key price in China’s economy. He Fan’s writings also leave no doubt 
that he understands the financial risks that China is taking by holding so many dollar-denominated assets.17
In many ways China today looks similar to Japan in the 1980s. Like Japan, China has high saving 
and  investment  shares,  an  export-led  growth  process,  big  current  account  surplus,  and  upward 
pressure upon its exchange rate. After the Plaza accord in the mid 1980s, the JPY appreciated by 
about 80 percent against the USD in a few years. Chinese policymakers have concluded that the 
blame for Japan´s “lost decade” lay largely with the appreciation of the JYP.
23 China has therefore 
only allowed the RMB to rise only gradually.
Amidst all the discussion about the RMB, one final thought is that the Chinese are bucking the 
recent trend to “move to the corners” when determining what type of exchange rate regime to run.  
Much recent economic literature has suggested that running intermediate exchange rate regimes, i.e. 
managed floats, basket pegs, crawling bands and the like, are too difficult to run for a country with 
open  capital  markets.  Speculative  pressures  will  sooner  or  later  challenge  the  credibility  of 
intermediate regimes and countries will thus be forced to move to the corners and adopt either full 
floats or hard pegs such as currency boards or dollarisation. Without doubt, the new exchange rate 
regime depends in large measure on China’s ability to maintain capital controls – in the absence of 
deep, liquid foreign exchange markets, traders and investors cannot bring market forces to bear 
against  Chinese  monetary  policy.  In other  words, once  China can  no  longer  maintain  effective 
capital controls, a flexible exchange rate regime will become more likely.
                                                
23  It  is,  however,  questionable  whether  Japan´s  real  mistake  was  the  sharp  appreciation  of  the  JYP.  An 
alternative perception is that the intrinsic mistake was the loose monetary policy trying to offset the impact of 
the rising JYP. This inflated the bubble and then prevented the central bank to ease monetary policy once the 
bubble had burst. 18
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